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THE CRISIS AS A TURNING POINT 







The impact of the economic crisis was dramatic in certain European 
Union member states; as early as 2008, Hungary and Latvia received 
combined rescue packages from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank and the European Union. Romania turned to the IMF in 
2009 and again in 2011. In 2010, Greece, as a member of the euro-area, 
received loans from the EU and the IMF. In the same year, a financial aid 
package was approved for Ireland, followed by one for Portugal in 2011. 
Spain requested financial assistance for the recapitalisation of its financial 
institutions in 2012. 
This trend begs the question of whether it was really an accident that 
the most vulnerable countries were all old and new, so-called cohesion 
countries of the EU that received support from the Cohesion Fund.1 In the 
media, as well as among experts, discussing the EU member states in 
terms of core and peripheral countries rapidly became commonplace and 
generally accepted. Should the crisis end one day, will this period have 
consequences, and will the countries return to the promising track they 
followed during their 5–25 year EU memberships? These questions are 
fundamentally important because one of the fundamental goals of 
European integration is to provide an opportunity to less-developed 
member states for convergence and to strengthen economic and social 
cohesion. The significance of convergence is also expressed in a European 
cohesion policy. The grave problems of old cohesion countries represent a 
particularly unexpected shock to integration, as their adaptation is usually 
considered a closed and completed process. Accordingly, all EU analyses 
                                                          
1 The old cohesion countries are Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, the new ones 
are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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and studies examine old cohesion countries as a part of the EU-15, i.e., the 
old member states, and only separately consider the new member states. 
In the fourth year of the crisis, it seems increasingly obvious that the 
cohesion countries cannot follow the same development trajectory as they 
did prior to the crisis. Our study will review how the crisis has affected the 
convergence results and how future perspectives can be appraised based 
on the evolution of the crisis to date. An investigation of the European 
convergence model reveals that it has vulnerabilities and limits that have 
not been revealed in the analyses of EU or World Bank experts. After 
studying these interpretations of convergence, we outline some necessary 
changes to the concept of European integration. 
2. Threatened results of convergence 
The convergence in terms of GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity was impressive before the crisis. In 1995, the contraction resulting 
from the economic transition came to an end in the post-socialist countries. 
Choosing this year as a basis for comparison, all of the cohesion countries 
were catching up with the EU-27 average, although to different degrees. 
Ireland, the poorest Baltic states, Slovakia and Poland made the greatest 
progress (Figure 7-1).2 
GDP per capita does not express the growth in a population’s welfare 
that is central to the meaning of convergence. Another indicator, actual 
individual final consumption (including expenditures on the consumption 
of goods and services by households and non-profit institutions serving 
households and in-kind social transfers) is more appropriate for this 
purpose. The general picture is similar, but the positioning of the countries 
is different; in the case of Ireland, the difference between the two 
indicators is striking (Figure 7-2). 
Summarising figures 7-1 and 7-2, we highlight that the crisis has 
injured the cohesion countries’ convergence towards the EU-27 average 
(with the exception of Poland and Slovakia); however, these countries 
were able to preserve the bulk of their convergence results to date 
(Table 7-1). In most cases, the loss in the final consumption values is 
greater than in GDP per capita. This means that in the countries that were 
severely hit by the crisis, there were changes in consumption in response 
to the recession and austerity measures. 
                                                          
2 To present the data in a clear and comprehensible manner, we omit the statistical 
data on the new member states Cyprus and Malta, as they are island states that do 
not share the common past and history of the Eastern and Central European region. 





Fig. 7-1 The development of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in the old 





Fig. 7-2 The development of per capita actual individual final consumption at 
purchasing power parity in the old and new cohesion countries compared to the 
EU-27 average 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database 
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Table 7-1 Catching-up in the actual individual final consumption of 
households and in GDP per capita with the EU-27 average compared 





GDP per capita 
 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Slovakia 30 32 26 27
Lithuania 29 24 26 22
Estonia 28 21 33 28
Poland 14 19 13 20
Latvia 24 18 21 16
Romania 14 10 14 13
Greece 14 8 8 6
Hungary 11 8 13 14
Bulgaria 11 7 12 12
Spain 10 6 13 9
Portugal 4 6 1 3
Slovenia 8 6 17 11
Czech 
Republic 3 3 4 3
Ireland 8 0 30 25
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and AMECO database 
 
The economic and financial crises in the cohesion countries have been 
thoroughly analysed (e.g., Becker et al. 2010, European Commission 
2009c, European Commission 2010b, Gardó and Martin 2010, Gligorov et 
al. 2012). These studies came to similar conclusions with respect to the 
“anatomy” of the crisis. Here, we do not provide a reconstruction of the 
crisis; rather, we focus only on the processes that severely affected the 
European convergence model. 
The crisis highlighted that the European Union has a unique growth 
model that makes it possible for relatively low-income countries to catch 
up rapidly with their richer neighbours. This model is based on foreign 
capital inflows. Europe is the only region where the different forms of 
private capital – both foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio funds – 
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flow downhill from richer to poorer countries and from low-growth to 
high-growth countries (Becker et al. 2010, Gill and Raiser 2012).  
At its outset, the crisis affected the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) and Mediterranean countries differently. In 2009, the 
rate of decline exceeded the EU average – with the exception of Poland – 
in every new member state, with the Baltic states suffering extremely large 
losses. In contrast, of the old cohesion countries, only Ireland experienced 
an immediate, strong recession; the others faced smaller scale, but 
prolonged, downturns. However, it has subsequently become increasingly 
clear that there is a common element in their situations: the previously 
advantageous growth model made them particularly vulnerable during the 
crisis when capital inflows fell. Despite the differences between the 
countries, the foreign capital-based convergence combined with low 
saving rates is a distinctive feature of catching-up in both the old and new 
cohesion countries. 
Scrutinising these countries, the severity of the recession unambiguously 
depended on the degree of pre-crisis economic imbalances. This is not 
surprising, but it seems to determine their development paths at least in the 
medium-term. The differences among the countries are instructive from 
the perspective of the convergence model. 
Three Central European countries, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia, did not accumulate notable disequilibria prior to the crisis. In the 
CEEC (including Hungary and Slovenia), growth was accompanied by 
small and improving trade imbalances, as a reflection of reindustrialisation 
after the economic transition that followed the fall of the socialist system. 
These five countries had little or no problems with respect to their 
competitiveness in their tradable sectors. Despite the favourable conditions 
in manufacturing, in Hungary, the initial levels of both private and public 
debt were high at the beginning of the crisis; the Slovenian economy was 
overheated (characterised by full capacity utilisation and inflation 
pressure) when the crisis broke out, and the private sector (mainly 
corporate) debt position increased (Farkas 2012, Tajnikar et al. 2011). Of 
the old cohesion countries, Ireland also coped with debt- rather than 
competitiveness-related problems. 
In the Mediterranean cohesion countries, the three Baltic states, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, growth in the period preceding the crisis was 
driven by domestic demand, whereas the contribution of net exports to 
growth was negative (European Commission 2009b, 2009c). In this 
second group, the current account balance deteriorated sharply, and these 
countries were on an unsustainable development path, even before the 
crisis. The underlying issue is that these economies suffer from 
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competitiveness issues in their tradable sectors, although Spain shows 
better results. The percentage of medium- and high-technology product 
exports as a percentage of total product exports demonstrates these 
differences (Figure 7-3). 
The division between Central European countries, Ireland and the 
others concerning competitive tradable sectors may be surprising because 
the forms of capital inflows differ between the old and new cohesion 
countries. In the new cohesion countries, the main form of foreign capital 
was FDI, while the old Mediterranean cohesion countries attracted 
portfolio and other capital inflows (Figure 7-4). However, the Central 
European countries were the primary beneficiaries of rapid technology 
transfer, where the FDI flowed into manufacturing, which is a tradable 
sector. (Slovenia is a special case where FDI stock remained low.) In the 
Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania, the FDI was biased in favour of 
banking, real estate and other non-tradable sectors. Unfortunately, the FDI 
thereby fuelled an unsustainable boom and contributed to the development 




Fig. 7-3 Medium- and high-technology product exports as a percentage of total 
product exports in the cohesion countries, 2007–2010 
Source: Author’s compilation from European Commission (2011a, 2012) and 
UNU-MERIT (2009, 2010) data 
 





Fig. 7-4 Capital flows in emerging countries, 2001–2004; 2005–2008 
Source: Gill and Raiser (2012, 134) 
Note: “EU coh.” refers to the EU old cohesion countries, “EU cand.” refers to EU 
candidate countries, “E. prtn.” refers to EU eastern partnership countries and 
“LAC” refers to the Latin America and the Caribbean region. CA stands for current 
account and FX is foreign exchange. 
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The different compositions of foreign capital can also be observed in 
the banking sector. In the new cohesion countries, banking instruments 
were 60–90% foreign-owned, whereas the same ratio for the EU-15 was 
between 10–50% (European Central Bank 2010). Despite this difference, 
due to financial integration, external vulnerability reached critical levels in 
both groups. In the Mediterranean countries, net foreign liabilities were 
approximately 80–100% of GDP at the start of the crisis (European 
Commission 2010b). The average for the new member states was over 
60%, and in the case of Bulgaria and Hungary, exceeded 100% (Jevčák 
et al. 2010). Of the old cohesion countries, Ireland and Spain were 
engaged in disciplined fiscal policy before the crisis, but real estate 
bubbles developed in both countries, and the bursting of these bubbles led 
to a crisis in the banking system that was transformed into a public debt 
crisis. This was particularly tragic for Ireland because, relative to its GDP, 
its banking sector was the largest in Europe (Kinsella 2011, Kovács and 
Halmosi 2012, OECD 2009, Udvari 2012). 
In Greece and Portugal, in addition to external disequilibrium, the 
fiscal policies followed by these countries also exhibited certain 
disciplinary problems after the introduction of the euro. Twin deficits 
developed, and Portugal stepped off the convergence path at the beginning 
of the 2000s. All three Mediterranean countries were characterised by 
stagnating productivity starting in the beginning of the 2000s. Greece, in 
particular, was characterised by a distinct drop in productivity 
(Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011, Royo 2010). 
Apart from Hungary, in the new cohesion countries, public debt 
remained under the 60% rate stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty, but with 
the exception of Estonia and Bulgaria, public debt rates began to increase 
significantly during the crisis.  
In the non-euro-zone countries, the exchange-rate regimes had a clear 
influence on the composition of capital inflows and the accumulation of a 
vulnerable external debt position. The Central European countries where 
the FDI went to the manufacturing sector, opted for more or less flexible 
exchange rates (Slovakia until mid-2008). Slovenia, with its peg or 
crawling peg system connected to the euro, was also an exception in this 
field. In fixed exchange-rate regimes (in the Baltic states and Bulgaria), it 
was the use of capital in the form of foreign loans rather than FDI that was 
preferable, especially in the banking and real-estate sectors. Taking 
domestic inflation into account, fixed currencies meant significant 
negative real interest rates for domestic borrowers. Credit supplying 
foreign banks did not need to rely on local markets for raising funds, and 
nominal interest rates were attractive. The fixed exchange-rate policy was 
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not changed during the crisis, and these countries could adjust their 
imbalances via internal devaluation, that is, domestic price and wage cuts 
(Becker et al. 2010). 
Although the growth rates in the majority of the new cohesion 
countries were again higher than the EU-15 or EU-27 average after the 
first wave of the crisis, these rates are high enough to ensure the 
mathematical convergence, but not sufficient enough to provide 
convergences that are perceptible for households in these countries, with 
the exemption of Poland and Slovakia (Table 7-2). (In the Baltic states and 
Romania, the higher rates compensate for the large GDP loss in 2009.) 
There is a danger that this situation is not temporary but the beginning of a 
medium-term or even longer trend. 
 
Table 7-2 Real GDP growth rates in the cohesion countries, 2011–2013 
 
 2011 2012* 2013*
EU-27  1.5 0 1.3
EU-15 1.4 -0.2 1.2
Bulgaria 1.7 0.5 1.9
Czech Republic 1.7 0 1.5
Estonia 7.6 1.6 3.8
Ireland 0.7 0.5 1.9
Greece -6.9 -4.7 0
Spain 0.7 -1.8 -0.3
Latvia 5.5 2.2 3.6
Lithuania 5.9 2.4 3.5
Hungary 1.6 -0.3 1
Poland 4.3 2.7 2.6
Portugal -1.6 -3.3 0.3
Romania 2.5 1.4 2.9
Slovenia -0.2 -1.4 0.7
Slovakia 3.3 1.8 2.9
Source: Eurostat 
Note: * = forecast. 
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The external conditions have been changing unfavourably for a longer 
time. The contracted markets of the economies in the European Union do 
not promote export-led growth in the cohesion countries, and the 
management of European debt crisis and stricter financial regulation 
decrease the capital available to the cohesion countries. FDI and cross-
border production networks cannot play as dynamic a role in the 
convergence as they did before the crisis. Financial markets’ risk 
evaluations may remain higher, even for those cohesion countries that are 
not affected by more severe financial difficulties. Due to the indebtedness 
of households and governments in the majority of the cohesion countries, 
the diminishing external resources and markets cannot substitute for 
domestic ones. 
Demographic processes are another factor that seemed to endanger 
convergence even before the crisis. By the mandate of the ECFIN Council, 
a group of experts investigates the age-related expenditures in the EU 
member states to 2060 regularly. This “Ageing Report 2009” had already 
indicated in 2009 that more rapid population declines in the new member 
states will slow the convergence process (European Commission 2009a). 
In the “Ageing Report 2012”, the population loss combined with the effect 
of the crisis resulted in diminishing productivity presented even gloomier 
prospects for the majority of the cohesion countries (European 
Commission 2011b). The population census that was conducted in most of 
the European countries in 2011 and 2012 indicates that the average 
population decline in the ten new member states almost doubled over the 
past decade, according to preliminary data. Approximately half of the 
reduction from 2000 to 2011 is due to net migration and the other half to a 
natural decrease. A more striking figure is that the population aged 0 to 14 
shrank by almost 25% (whereas the corresponding figure for the EU-15 is 
approximately 1%) (Gligorov et al. 2012). 
3. Interpretation of the European convergence 
The slowdown of convergence in European integration is a substantial 
challenge because the achievement of the European Union in this field is 
one of the main bases for legitimating the existence of integration, and, for 
the populations of the cohesion countries, it is the most convincing and 
attractive element of the EU membership. The Treaty on the European 
Union declares the EU’s aims, one of which is that the EU “shall promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among member 
states” (Art. 3(3) TEU). 
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The crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of the European 
convergence model with respect to its dependence on foreign capital. 
However, if we study the assessments of European convergence carefully, 
we find other problems that are not explicitly revealed. We select two very 
thorough and influential analyses to show how these issues can affect the 
future of integration. One of the analyses is the report on the “Five years 
of an enlarged EU” that resulted from the collaboration of several 
Commission services of the EU and it only investigates the new member 
states (European Commission 2009b). The other work is a book by the 
World Bank’s experts on “Golden Growth. Restoring the Lustre of the 
European Economic Model” (Gill and Raiser 2012), which scrutinises the 
entire European Union. It is remarkable that both follow the same logic in 
assessing the European convergence model. Gill and Raiser (2012) 
contrast the economic achievements of the new and old cohesion 
countries; they interpret the convergence of the former group of countries 
as a success story and the old Mediterranean cohesion countries’ 
performances by and large as a failure.  
In both analyses, the main arguments of the advantages of the 
European convergence model are the growth performances of the lagging 
countries and their capital-intensive export structures. They regard trade 
openness, FDI inflows and institutional improvements resulting from EU 
accession as the key drivers of growth. The EU report estimates that “each 
year during the period 2000–2008 accession gave the new member states 
an extra growth boost of approximately 1¾% on average… Model 
simulations suggest that…the new member states enjoy 50–100 basis 
points advantage relative to other emerging countries with comparable 
fundamentals” (European Commission 2009b, 17). 
Both analyses agree that foreign capital inflows made it possible to 
overcome the lack of savings in the cohesion countries. Gill and Raiser 
(2012) emphasise that Europe is the only region where capital flows in the 
“right” direction, that is, towards poorer, high-growth countries. The EU 
report highlights that this catching-up model prompted current account 
deficits and the appreciation of real exchange rates. It supposes that, as a 
result of the global crisis, the slowdown of capital inflows will lead to 
significant contractions in economic activity, and in some of the new 
member states the income gap with richer EU countries will widen, at least 
temporarily. Gill and Raiser (2012) also call for prudence when financing 
is plentiful. 
According to both investigations, FDI played a prominent role in the 
productivity growth in emerging Europe directly (investment) and 
indirectly (spill-over effects). The EU report provides a detailed overview 
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on the knowledge spill-over effects of FDI in the empirical literature, 
which has contradictory results but the EU report regards the positive 
effects as decisive.  
FDI is also closely connected with the other advantage of the European 
convergence model, the increased technological content and quality of the 
export basket. Both analyses underline, based on statistical data, that new 
member states’ trade is becoming sophisticated and they have become 
even more specialised in capital-intensive goods.  
This picture on the European convergence model would be convincing 
and unambiguous. However, both documents contain further elements that 
make their interpretation inconsistent. They also highlight the convergence 
model from the perspective of the non-cohesion countries. The EU report 
refutes the danger of the relocation of production and jobs. This occurs 
rather in the case of the efficiency-seeking manufacturing sector, but 70% 
of outward direct investment from the old to the new member states is in 
the services sector and of a market-seeking type, thus limiting the job 
losses. In some sectors where changes in competitive position lead to 
relocation, it helps to maintain competitiveness for corporations that 
maintain their more skilled-based units of production, technology 
development and ownership in mature economies (that is in the non-
cohesion countries). Labour-intensive elements of production and routine 
tasks are located in the new member states. 
Gill and Raiser (2012) also explain the success of convergence through 
reconfiguration of the value chain in Continental and Northern European 
based companies after the collapse of communism. They located their 
assembly activities in Central and Eastern Europe, and due to lower wages 
they could strengthen their competitiveness through their flexibility in 
offshoring. Central and Eastern Europe could integrate not only within the 
EU but also within the world economy through increased productivity. 
According to the authors, the reason for the difficult situation in Southern 
Europe is that these countries did not participate in these processes and 
they have few global companies. The EU can be described as a three-
speed union with the Continental and Northern leaders, the Central and 
Eastern chasers and Southern laggards. 
Gill and Raiser (2012) address innovation in a separate chapter. They 
define innovation as a source of long-term growth differentials. They note 
that “Europe’s east is catching up in productivity, but remains far behind in 
innovation. For these countries, sustaining productivity growth is what 
matters, but the innovation gap so far has not been a binding constraint” 
(Gill and Raiser 2012, 256). Therefore, their policy recommendation is 
that countries in Central and Eastern Europe need not invest much more in 
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R&D and knowledge production. They should adopt existing technologies 
via FDI and trade links. 
Neither assessment raises the questions that resulted from their 
analyses. Both accept convergence as a fundamental goal, but they do not 
address the issue of whether this model is appropriate to reach this goal or 
it has limits.  
The above-mentioned expert group of “Ageing Report 2012” has 
already confronted the catching-up problem. They had to decide whether 
they assume convergence in either GDP level or GDP growth rate over the 
long-term projection exercise. Some exercises were run in the expert 
group that showed some convergence in GDP levels in past periods, but 
the growth rate needed to allow for this convergence in the projections (to 
2060!) would not be plausible in the short- and medium-term. Thus, the 
expert group decided to assume that there would be convergence in growth 
rates in the long run (European Commission 2011b). 
The limits of convergence can be derived not only from econometric 
projections but also from the EU report (European Commission 2009b) 
and Gill and Raiser (2012). Their analyses outline a division of labour and 
production between the north-western countries and the new member 
states. Although there are possibilities of upgrading along the value chain, 
there is no reason to assume that foreign companies will abandon their key 
positions in innovation, technology development and strategic decision-
making. It seems to be much more likely that the current labour and 
production division will essentially be reproduced. Another possibility 
could be that spill-over effects help the domestic companies to foster 
internationally competitive economies that are able to accelerate and to 
complete the catching-up process. The literature on FDI spill-overs shows 
unambiguous positive productivity effects in the case of vertical, backward 
linkages. Domestic firms occupy the dependent position in these 
relationships. The horizontal spill-over effects seem to be weak in the 
overwhelming majority of empirical investigations (Gorodnichenko et al. 
2007, Hanousek et al. 2010).3 The third means of economic development 
would be to strengthen domestic capital accumulation. As we have seen, 
the cohesion countries have high levels of FDI inflows coupled with low 
savings rates. Therefore, domestic investment was not a decisive factor in 
this model, in contrast to some Asian countries. 
Due to the low initial GDP levels in the cohesion countries, the above-
outlined contradictions and the limits of the European convergence model 
could be disregarded; it provided sufficient space for the cohesion 
                                                          
3 Both studies provide a comprehensive overview of the literature concerning spill-
over effects in emerging Europe. 
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countries to develop. However, it is remarkable that the Czech Republic, 
which had one of the highest initial GDP levels in Central and Eastern 
Europe and is one of the “best pupils” in following the European 
convergence model, has made very moderate progress in catching-up 
(Table 7-1). Slovenia, with its higher initial GDP level, has achieved 
greater convergence but has always chosen different means, focusing on 
domestic economy and had already accumulated imbalances prior to the 
crisis.  
In sum, it is questionable whether the European convergence model is 
appropriate for the long run catching-up of those countries that are already 
close to the efficiency/technical frontier. If the crisis had not occurred, the 
poorer countries could have further developed within the framework of the 
European convergence model, even if the development would have been 
concentrated in the areas that had attracted foreign capital (typically the 
capitals and their agglomerations) accompanied by increasing regional 
inequalities. 
4. Conclusions 
Assuming that the foreign capital inflows would return to the cohesion 
countries to their status prior to the crisis, the European convergence 
model could be restored despite its limits. The actors would be aware of 
the larger vulnerability of cohesion countries’ economies, and European 
economic governance, e.g. in the form of the excessive imbalances 
procedure could help to avoid similar difficulties. 
However, the only certainty in the current crisis is that things will not 
get back on track. The above-mentioned EU report (European Commission 
2009b) did not address this problem at the beginning of the crisis; it 
simply referred to growth slowdowns and the new member states having a 
long way to go to full convergence. Gill and Raiser (2012) raise a question 
regarding the future of the European convergence model. They are very 
optimistic: “Restarting the convergence machine will not be difficult” (Gill 
and Raiser 2012, 10). The task is very simple; a single market for services 
should be completed. Although market liberalisation in services would be 
advantageous for the cohesion countries, it is difficult to imagine that it 
could compensate for the diminishing external and internal sources that we 
have already outlined. 
In their common studies, experts at Bruegel, a European think tank, 
and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, an 
independent research institute, made more sophisticated policy suggestions 
to reorient the European convergence model. Their starting point is that 
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the reduction in the private sector savings-investment gap is unavoidable. 
In the medium-term this leads to the problem of dampened domestic 
demand. A sustained re-launch of growth requires a more efficient use of 
savings than in the past. They list a range of policies (human capital, 
technology, industrial and regional) that should be employed to improve 
the competitiveness of tradable sectors (Becker et al. 2010). 
We can draw two conclusions independently from the ultimate 
outcome of the global crisis: 
 
• Even if the economic actors in a country, including the government, 
adjust their behaviour and economic policies successfully, we 
cannot assume a return to the speed of convergence prior to the 
crisis. 
• The reorientation of the growth model requires very professional 
government activities to promote the competitiveness of the 
tradable sector. It is difficult to believe that all of the governments 
in the cohesion countries will be able to exhibit high levels of 
administrative performance. 
 
These consequences of the global crisis make some changes in the 
concept of integration necessary. As we have seen, the degree and speed of 
convergence between countries has played a central role in assessments 
regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of European integration in 
recent decades. If the necessary adjustments to the post-crisis reality are 
not carried out at the conceptual level of European integration, the 
legitimacy of integration will be jeopardised. The Union’s raison d’être in 
the next decade will be tied to the fact that without integration, European 
countries would not be considered global economic players. If, however, 
the speed of convergence remains a measure of the success of integration, 
the EU will doom itself. 
One of the most important lessons from the last two decades is that the 
positive FDI spill-over effects are limited in market transactions. If foreign 
capital becomes scarcer, it will be even more important to promote the 
positive spill-over effects through economic policy. Even if there are 
numerous studies on the channels of spill-over effects and other measures 
of local economic development, the problems of a dual economy and the 
development of an internationally competitive domestic economy are 
missing from EU policies (e.g., cohesion, innovation). Failing to bridge 
the productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies makes 
catching-up impossible. However, the policy measures to develop a 
competitive domestic economy are essentially in the hands of national 
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governments. The EU’s cohesion policy only has a significant impact if 
the national economic policy creates the appropriate environment. In 
addition, the success of economic policy depends on not only the 
government but also on the state of social capital and other social and 
institutional conditions. 
Despite these difficulties, efforts must be taken to maintain cohesion at 
the level of relevant policies because a certain degree of inequality leads to 
disintegration. Cohesion policy must remain an important tool to this end, 
a tool that reinforces a common European identity and a palpable 
manifestation of solidarity for the populations of cohesion countries that 
are already experiencing difficult times. Cohesion assistance should not be 
expected to be able to do anything more than dampen the effects of the 
unfavourable tendencies described above; it would be unrealistic to expect 
such assistance to bring about a reversal of these effects. 
The content of cohesion policy should be revised. At present, it focuses 
on the support of SMEs, although the real problem in the cohesion 
countries is the productivity gap between foreign and domestic companies 
that cannot be addressed with the division of companies into large firms 
and SMEs.4 
Considering all of these aspects, we cannot count on an economically 
and socially homogeneous area in the foreseeable future as the current 
integration concept does. To maintain a multi-speed integration will be the 
most important challenge for European integration. 
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Hungarian economic performance over the last decade. 
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